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1 Introduction
In the recent period US public opinion showed renewed interest about the economic impact
of fiscal policy. At the end of 2013, an intense debate and media coverage concerned the
US federal government shutdown. The tensions that ultimately produced this shutdown
began because of the different perspectives of policy-makers concerning the deficit reduc-
tion through a simultaneous increase in tax rates and decrease in government spending.
One motivation of this debate is that the economic literature did not provide conclusive
results of how public expenditure and its financing mechanism can affect the economic
performance of private sector, because it mainly depends on the theoretical perspective
and the empirical methodology used (Cogan et al., 2010).
The neoclassical approach suggests a strategic explanation to account for the economic
effects of large cyclical rises in government spending. Based on major unexpected political
events, it assumes that the periods of increased military spending correspond to the dates
of war or the threat of war. Ramey and Shapiro (1998), later extended by Ramey’s recent
work (2011), proposed a so-called "narrative" approach, which selected the start of the
three wars in which the US actively intervened, Korean, Vietnam and the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan and the 2001 terroristic attack, to identify large exogenous increases in
the US defense spending empirically. Edelberg et al. (1999), Burnside et al. (2004)
and Barro (2011) produced closely related follow-ups of the work by Ramey and Shapiro
(1998). The significant criticism of this approach is that other substantial fiscal shocks
may have occurred at around the same time, thus interfering with identification of the
military build-up shocks and inferences on the effects of fiscal policy1.
Following the seminal paper of Blanchard and Perotti (2002), the economic litera-
ture has proposed an alternative approach to test the effects of fiscal policy on economy.
In particular, a large set of studies has focused on vector autoregressive (VAR) models
with differences in the identification issues of fiscal shocks. A very large body of empiri-
cal literature includes structural restrictions of impulse response functions (Uhlig, 2005;
Mountford and Uhlig, 2005; Canova and Pappa, 2007; Enders et al., 2008), relations
among variables and error terms in the structural form (Marcellino, 2006; Beetsma et al.,
2006; Beetsma, 2008; Benetrix and Lane, 2009; Corsetti et al., 2012), or the inclusion of
external and institutional information which tends to exploit the quarterly nature of data
and fiscal policy decision lags (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Perotti, 2005; Muller, 2008;
Monacelli and Perotti, 2008).
This paper reviews the empirical economic consequences of changes in US fiscal policy
following a baseline structural VAR (SVAR) model extended for the fiscal components
of military sector and civilian government purchases. We mostly focus on the short-
run consequences of government spending, because the main question of interest is to
what extent unexpected military and non-military expenditures produce effects on private
1As an example of this debate, Perotti (2005) argues that "Ramey and Shapiro date the start of the Korean war shock
in 1950:3, based on the large observed increase in military spending; but in four quarters between 1948:2 and 1950:3,
government spending increased by between two and three standard deviations. It is not obvious how to disentangle the
effects of the Korean dummy variable from the delayed effects of these large fiscal shocks".
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consumption, that accounts for more than 60% of US GDP. Our main contribution is
to show that differences on private consumption effects are based on how the shocks
on these government components are driven by their persistence and types of financing
mechanisms.
We base our hypotheses on the findings of Galì’s et al. (2007) that a positive govern-
ment spending shock leads to a significant increase in private consumption when military
spending is excluded by the data2, to infer the hypothesis that military spending has a
negligible or negative impact on consumption. However, the literature found conflicting
empirical results. For example, Hall’s (1986) analysis using annual data back to 1920,
and identifying government spending shocks through shifts in military spending, finds a
slightly negative effect of government purchases on consumption.
Similarly to Blanchard and Perotti (2002), who estimate output fiscal effects, we report
a comparison of the VAR effects of military and civilian spending shocks of consumption
for the US: while we find a negative effect of military expenditure on consumption, this
does not exclude reconciling this result within the new Keynesian prediction for fiscal
effect in aggregate, since our results show that civilian government purchases have a large
effect on private consumption.
In this paper, following the most recent literature (see among the others, Canzoneri
et al. 2012; Zubairy, 2014; Jacob, 2015), we develop a new Keynesian model to mimic
the empirical results. This framework offers the advantage to take into account forward
looking expectations of households and firms, and encompasses many ingredients of recent
dynamic optimizing sticky price models, although it is modified by allowing for the pres-
ence of consumers subject to credit constraints3. In fact, the basic intertemporal model
upon representative agents predicts the negative wealth effect associated with an increase
in the tax burden, which lowers households disposable income and, in turn, their con-
sumption expenditures. Despite this negative wealth effect, the response of consumption
to a spending shock can be positive under the presence of non-Ricardian consumers (Galì
et al., 2007).
In our theoretical model, we extend the original framework of Bilbiie et al., (2008) by
disentangling civilian and military spending shocks. We motivate our framework according
to two main findings of our empirical estimates. Firstly, we observed a stronger persistence
of military spending shock than civilian spending shock. In particular, the high persistence
of the military spending shock increases the negative wealth effect on Ricardian households
and further lowers their consumption spending. As a consequence, we observe a "crowding-
out" effect on total private consumption. Secondly, our empirical estimates show the
effects of a different financing mechanism of civilian and military expenditures. The
former is financed by the increase in taxation rate contrarily to the latter that is mainly
related government budget deficit. In our view, the heterogeneity of consumers also
implies different spreads through which fiscal policy transmits the effects to the economy
2This result is also in accordance with the recent paper of Caldara and Kamps (2012), showing that private consumption
increases following a positive aggregate government spending shock.
3See, Campbell and Mankiw (1989), for the original description of the economic behavior of non-Ricardian consumers,
and Cogan et al. (2010) for a clear discussion between New Keynesian and old Keynesian government spending multipliers.
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and it is made explicit by the financing mechanism of deficit and of current government
spending. This issue is particularly important in our analysis, when we examine the effects
of military spending with respect a civilian spending because, for example, differences in
the taxation propensity (or other forms of financing) lead to heterogeneous responses in
private consumption. Differently from Favero and Giavazzi (2007), who explicitly include
the long run government budget constraint, the new Keynesian model presented below
comprises, along with a taxation rule, a deficit financing rule.
Our simulated results of the baseline new Keynesian model show that private con-
sumption responds positively to civilian spending whereas military expenditure affect
negatively private consumption. Both the model results seem to be at work in explaining
the empirical results of aggreagate government spending in private consumption. Then,
some robustness tests are presented comparing the dynamic responses of private consump-
tion to different persistences and financing mechanisms of civilian and military spending
shocks. We also analyze the impact of the these two components of government spend-
ing on private consumption in the cases of different shares of Ricardian households and
degrees of price rigidites.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the basic literature
and some stylized facts of how the US finances government spending, in particular within
the identified war dates. Section 3 presents our empirical specifications showing the data
and discussing the identification procedure. Here, estimation results are shown with par-
ticular regard to the reaction of private consumption to different kinds of government
expenditure shocks. Section 4 presents our theoretical framework and the model calibra-
tion. Section 5 examines the simulated impulse response of consumption to the different
government spending shocks, focusing on its consistency with the empirical evidence.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Private consumption and the financing mechanism of govern-
ment spending components
Barro (1974, 1979, 1981) conducted several studies highlighting the economic effects of
government spending and the alternative methods and impacts of financing this expen-
diture. In particular, Barro (1981) stressed the fact that government expenditures can
provide direct welfare to economic agents, and that variations in the level of government
expenditure may have an impact on the consumption decisions of households. On the
other hand, part of the literature built on this argument showing that different sources of
financing of the public sector components led to a different impact on private consumption
when consumers were constrained in their asset purchases.
Here, we focus on the different mechanisms used to finance it in the US. Table 1 shows
the financing sources of government outlays (e.g., military and civilian) under the direct
control of the fiscal policy4. We also stress that our interest focuses on shocks near war
4Note that this difference between revenue and expenditure is not matched by changes in money supply.
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time (including times in threat of war) to account for more unanticipated expenditure
and financing behavior. As a link with the literature, we refer to the US war episodes
described by Ramey (2011) except for the Korean War, which is outside our sample. This
choice does not meaningfully affect the results since the variation in military spending
was important during the 1960’s and the 1970’s (Bilbiie et al., 2008; Pieroni, 2009).
From Table 1 we can observe that, at the peak of the war episodes, the percentage of
budget deficit in GDP was around 4-6%. However, the tax revenue did not change at the
onset of war episodes, except during the Carter-Reagan military build-up, when taxation
was cut. This "conservative policy" also produced a reduction in taxation during the
Afghanistan and the second Iraq campaign, leaving almost the whole burden of military
outlay on borrowing from the public. Similarly, the data do not provide evidence that
reductions in other government spending represent military outlay financing course, al-
though we note that there is a significant reduction in civilian outlay in the Carter-Reagan
military build-up5.
We motivate our paper’s contribution stating that the effects of military spending
on private consumption also depend on the financing mechanisms of government outlay,
recognizing that unplanned episodes like wars are generally financed by budget deficits.
Thus, from the Keynesian perspective, wars typically determine a short-term economic
boom boosting aggregate demand and consumption, since greater military outlay is not
offset by the contraction caused by higher taxes. It is within this policy debate that
Feldstein (2008) suggested that any Department of Defense (DoD) budget cuts may be
misguided. He also argued that in the recent downturn cycle, the US government should
have recognized the need to increase government spending to offset the decline in consumer
demand in the economy, and argued that a rise in military spending would be the best
way to provide this stimulus.
The latter predictions are not in line with empirical results in defense economics.
Boulding (1973), Edelstein (1990) and Pieroni (2009) have shown that private consump-
tion responds negatively to military expenditure increases - even if not always statistically
significant - a result similar to those obtained for private investments (Smith, 1980). These
results may be in line with the neoclassical hypothesis of the diversion of government re-
sources. The data shown above seem to emphasize the complexity of the effects in the
transmission channel toward private consumption, at least, because the financing of the
defense sector - and its shocks - may be related to those of civilian spending. Thus, by
analyzing government spending effects between these components, one aim is to capture
explicitly the different persistence of the spending shocks. We extend these arguments
by a new Keynesian DSGE framework to find an explanation for the possible sources of
the crowding-out effect in military consumption observed in some empirical evidence. We
incorporate into our model a share of households who do not have access to the bond
market and who consume their current disposable income at each date. We show the
5This result is not in contrast with the findings of Beetsma et al. (2007) who identified "within" substitutions between
military and civilian spending since the positive trend of civilian spending is associated with a stable pattern of military
spending, excluding war episodes.
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co-existence of sticky prices and a different rule of financing mechanisms for military and
civilian spending. The next section illustrates the estimated impulse response analysis of
the components of fiscal policy for the US.
[Table 1 about here.]
3 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we provide evidence of the above-mentioned discussion by estimating the
impulse response functions (IRFs). We compare the results of the fiscal policy shocks of
the expenditure of military and civilian components in private consumption to explain
how contrasting theoretical models may rationalize the heterogeneity of the effects upon
them.
3.1 Specification and Identification
The strategy adopted here to identify the VAR model is based on the assumptions dis-
cussed in Bilbiie et al. (2008) that are consistent with the solution of the log-linearized
theoretical model presented in next Section6. In addition, the use of quarterly data sup-
ports the exogenous changes of civilian and military spending, respectively. This is in
line with the new Keynesian perspective which sustains that a discretionary fiscal policy
plausibly does not respond within a quarter to a change in the economy7.
As a baseline specification of our model we adopt a SVAR, the reduced form of which
is defined by the following dynamic equation:
Yt = c+ A (L)Yt−1 + Ut (1)
where Yt indicates the vector of variables specified below, A(L) is an auto-regressive lag
polynomial, c a constant term, and Ut the vector of reduced-form innovations. We focus
our analysis on the US and use a dataset from 1960:Q1 to 2010:Q4. The reasons for
choosing the US were based on the data availability making this economy the main case
study of the effects of fiscal policy.
There is a substantial issue associated with the perspective that private agents receive
signals about future changes in government spending before these changes take place,
which affects the validity of the SVAR representations. In particular, the anticipation
effect of the expenditure in the military sector argued by Ramey (2011) may lead to dif-
ferences in the shock effects of this component on the economy. Following this literature8,
we include dummy variables in the "military" VAR system that controls for anticipation
6A recent review of the identification strategy in the VAR literature is discussed in Beetsma and Giulidori (2011).
7Following Auerbach (2000, p. 16), "there are many reasons why fiscal decisions announced in advance may not be taken
at face value by the public. The yearly budget is often largely a political document, which is discounted as such by the
private sector; any decision to change taxes or spending in the future may be modified before the planned implementation
time arrives; and... changes in expenditure policy typically have involved not simply changes in program rules, but rather
changes in future spending targets, with the ultimate details left to be worked out later and the feasibility of eventually
meeting the targets uncertain."
8See, also Forni and Gambetti (2010), Leeper et al. (2012) and Leeper et al. (2013).
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effects, corresponding to the dates which accounts to the major military news described
in Ramey and Shapiro (1998). More specifically, these dates are: 1965:1, 1980:1, 2001:39.
We estimate separately the impulse responses of military and civilian spending shocks
from a five-variable VAR because they are not significantly linked, identifying separate
transmission effects on economy. Following the strategy mentioned in equation (1), we
specify before the model analyzing the effects of the civilian component:
Yt = [Ct,Wt, DINCt, BDt, NMt] (2)
composed of private consumption Ct, real wages Wt, disposable income DINCt, the
government budget deficit BDt and the civilian spending NMt10. The empirical speci-
fication includes, respectively: the log of real private final consumption expenditure per
capita (C); real wages (W ), corresponding to the log of real compensation of employees;
disposable income (DINC), corresponding to real personal disposable income (obtained
from the FRED-II database). Civilian spending (NM) obtained from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (National Economic Accounts) as difference between government con-
sumption expenditure and national defense data11; and a measure of budget deficit (BD)
corresponding to gross government fixed capital formation (IG) minus net government
saving (SAV G). Consistently with the model developed herein, both civilian spending
and the budget deficit enter the VAR as a ratio of lagged GDP. All the others real vari-
ables are deflated by the GDP deflator. The variables are then expressed in per capita
terms dividing them by working-age population.
As an identification strategy for fiscal policy shocks, we adopt a Cholesky factoriza-
tion, in order to recover the vector of structural shocks t (and its variance Ω) from the
reduced-form error Ut in (1). It is worthwhile noticing that the structural identification of
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) of government spending shocks is identical to a Choleski de-
composition, in which government spending is ordered before the other variables12. Here,
we assume the following set of conditions. We consider civilian spending as the most
exogenous variable and analyze the effects of its increase (temporary or permanent). The
interaction between civilian expenditure and taxation rate influences the budget deficit: if
the civilian spending increase is financed by tax rises the budget deficit may be negative.
Conversely, if a civilian expenditure rise is not followed by a corresponding increase in
taxation rate, the budget deficit is positive. We implicitly assume that there are het-
erogeneous behaviors of consumers that include in the choice set decisions in the asset.
Because household demands for goods depend on the expected value of taxes (i.e., dispos-
able income), each household subtracts its share of this present value (real wage) from the
expected present value of income, in order to determine a net wealth position. Lastly, we
consider private consumption as the most endogenous variable, which is therefore affected
9With respect to Ramey (2011) the Korean date (1950:1) is excluded because it is outside of our sample.
10The source for almost all the variables used is the OECD Economic Outlook No. 88.
11Since we are interested in short to medium-run effects of shocks to government purchases on private consumption,
we omit investments from the data. As a robustness check, we include service of capital, but results obtained in the
VAR-estimates were close to those presented below.
12As in Blanchard and Perotti (2002), the condition for identification is that the component of government spending does
not respond to government or private macro-economic variables, contemporaneously.
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by all contemporaneous values of all the variables in the VAR.
Since we are primarily concerned with comparison of the private consumption effects
of civilian and military shocks, we repeat the same experiment substituting civilian ex-
penditure (NMt) with military spending (Mt) in the VAR model. In this case, the vector
of variables Yt in equation (1) may be expressed as:
Yt = [Ct,Wt, DINCt, BDt,Mt] . (3)
Similarly to the civilian spending case, military spending enters the VAR as a ratio
of lagged GDP. Military spending (M) is always obtained from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. Again, we adopt a Cholesky factorization in which private consumption, real
wages, disposable income and budget deficits are allowed to depend on the fiscal variable
(in this case, military expenditure) and are ordered, respectively.
It is worth also noting that following the literature on the effects of fiscal components
on the economy, a characteristic of the government expenditure in VAR models is its
persistence driven by the presence of trends. Figure 1 plots the US federal military and
civilian expenditures as relative shares of GDP. Military spending has a clear downward
trend, while civilian spending is more stationary. In general, the presence of trends in
fiscal series (as shares of GDP) is not limited to non-defense spending, but is pervasive.
For instance, in the dataset used by Leeper et al. (2010) to estimate a DSGE model using
Bayesian techniques, tax revenues, transfers, and government spending (all as shares of
GDP) have trends, and those trends differ from each other. Therefore, we deal with those
trends including the linear trend in the model specification, which is also consistent with
our DSGE model of Section 4.
[Figure 1 about here.]
3.2 Results
We estimate two VAR models according to specification equations (2) and (3) in order to
obtain the empirical IRFs. According to the Schwarz information criterion, the number
of lags is set to two. Diagnostic tests indicate the absence of serial correlation in the
residuals by a Lagrange Multiplier test. We also fail to reject the hypothesis of normality of
residuals with Jarque-Bera statistics and check the stability condition of the VAR, finding
that all eigenvalues lie comfortably inside the unit circle. We also test for the presence of
cointegrating relationships among the variables, finding mixed evidence according to rank
and maximum eigenvalue tests. As a result, we decide not to impose any cointegrating
restriction, and thus estimate both the VARs with the variables in levels (Sims et al.,
1990; Giordano et al., 2007).
Figure 2 shows the effects of civilian spending on endogenous variables of equation (2).
In accordance with this line of inquiry, in order to derive the 16th and 84th percentiles
of the impulse response distribution in the graphs, we perform Monte Carlo simulations
and assume normality in the parameter distribution. Accordingly, we construct t-tests
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based on 10,000 different responses generated by simulations, and check whether the
point estimates of the mean impulse responses are statistically different from zero. The
responses of the five variables are expressed by multiplying the estimated parameters of
the VAR by the sample average share of civilian spending in GDP.
We note that civilian spending (graph a)) increases significantly and does not display
a large persistence. To give an idea in order to compare below with shocks in military
spending, the pattern of persistence decreases with a half-life of about two years. The
response of the budget deficit variable (graph b)) indicates a contrasting pattern: al-
though it starts positively, it decreases and remains significantly negative, meaning that
unexpected civilian expenditure appears to be financed by an increase in the taxation
rate.
We observe a positive response for disposable income (graph c) for the time-length
considered. This result is in line with the prediction of the new Keynesian models, where
the low persistence of civilian spending shock along with constraints in asset market
participation reduces the wealth effect on asset holders.
As predicted by the new Keynesian models, real wage (graphs d)) shows a positive
and persistent response to a unitary shock of civilian spending. Most interestingly, the
effect of a civilian expenditure shock on consumption is shown to be significant for a
large time-span, persistently above zero (graph e)). As we can observe, the response of
consumption follows that of disposable income.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Figure 3 displays the IRFs of VAR in equation (3) to a positive shock in military
spending. Defense expenditure response (graph a)) rises significantly showing a higher
persistence with respect to civilian shocks. From the patterns of IFRs, we estimate that
to achieve half-life takes more than eight years. Graph b) pertains to the estimated
response of the budget deficit variable, reproducing the evidence in the US, shown in the
Section 2, that the defense sector is largely financed by budget deficits. The response of
disposable income is negative (graph c); this effect is driven by the high persistence of
military spending shock that strengthens the wealth effect on Ricardian households.
The point estimates shown in the IRFs indicate that real wages decrease in response
to the military spending shock (graph d)). Interestingly, as found in the defense spending
literature which follows the neoclassical point of view, the pattern of consumption also
decreases its impact (graph e)), and the point estimates reveal that the shock may produce
a significant effect. Also in this case, the consumption follows the pattern of disposable
income response.
[Figure 3 about here.]
The robustness of our results is tested by the estimated impact multipliers on con-
sumption. In particular, the impact multiplier on consumption measures the change in
the level of consumption k periods ahead in response to a change in the fiscal variable of
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interest given by ∆Ft at time t 13:
Impact multiplier k periods ahead =
(
∆Ct+k
∆Ft
)
(4)
thus, the civilian spending impact multiplier is given by, ∆Ct+k∆NMt , and for the military
spending the impact multiplier is given by ∆Ct+k∆Mt .
Table 2 shows the results14. Particularly interesting for our study is the fact that
positive multipliers on consumption of civilian expenditure, for the 1st, the 4th, the 8th
and the 12th quarter, are +0.06, +0.36, +0.82 and +1.01, respectively. On the contrary
(as expected from the point estimates) consumption multipliers are negative for military
expenditure for the same quarters, between −0.09, −0.11, −0.10 and −0.08, respectively.
Confidence intervals of these government expenditures at 95% also indicate a statistical
significance of separate consumption multipliers, emphasizing the important differences
in the transmission IRFs responses of military and civilian expenditures shocks on private
consumption.
[Table 2 about here.]
4 A Theoretical Model
The previous section showed the dynamic consequences of fiscal policy shocks for civilian
and military components on the US consumption. Our aim here is to assess whether our
model can account for these estimated patterns.
As we will observe below, our theoretical framework is fully consistent with the em-
pirical strategy of the previous section. Indeed, we adopt a solution of our DSGE model
which implies that the several variables are expressed as their respective log deviations
from the model steady state. Therefore, an unanticipated shock to civilian (or military)
spending causes the temporary change of any given variable of our model before return-
ing to its steady state. Accordingly, this interpretation of civilian and military shocks fits
consistently with the results of the impulse response analysis of our estimated structural
VAR in Section 3.
In what follows, firstly we present the log-linearized equations under a simple dynamic
general equilibrium model with new Keynesian predictions. Then, we focus on the key
fiscal transmission channels related to: (i) the financing mechanism of the specific expen-
diture, and (ii) the persistence of military and civilian shocks. Finally, we discuss the
parameters used in the calibration of the model.
13For example, the civilian spending multiplier is computed as follows, ∆Ct+k∆NMt =
%∆Ct+k
%∆NMt
C
NM
, where C and NM are the
steady state values of consumption and civilian expenditure, respectively.
14We also computed the civilian and military impact multipliers on output. As we have a different goal in this paper, we
do not report these results that are available upon request.
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4.1 The Basic new Keynesian Framework
This subsection describes the model, which follows the framework of Galì et al. (2007).
The model consists of an economy populated by a continuum of infinitely lived households
in which these are divided into Ricardian and non-Ricardian behaviors. In particular, con-
sider λ the share of non-Ricardian households present in the economy, that is, households
which do not have access to capital markets and consume their current labor income.
Conversely, complementary share 1− λ defines Ricardian households.
As regards labor market structure, it is assumed that there is an economy-wide union
setting wages in a centralized manner. Hence, hours worked are not chosen optimally by
households, but are determined by firms, given the wage set and the union.
The economy produces a single final good and a continuum of intermediate goods. The
aggregate production function includes both capital and labor inputs. The total factor
productivity is assumed to follow a first order autoregressive process. The final goods
sector is perfectly competitive and is consumed by households. There is monopolistic
competition in the markets for intermediate goods, each of which is produced by a single
firm. The model assumes that intermediate goods producer faces restrictions in the price
setting process, as in Calvo (1983). In particular, θ defines the probability of a firm
keeping its prices unchanged, and 1 − θ that of an intermediate firm can re-optimize its
prices. The model encompasses a monetary authority which sets its policy instrument,
the nominal interest rate, according to a generalized Taylor rule (1993).
The detailed linearized model is set out in Table 3, except the equations related to the
government sector.
[Table 3 about here.]
We are going to analyze them in detail in the next subsection since our main contri-
bution relates to consumption responses to shocks of fiscal policy components.
4.2 The Government Sector: Military and Civilian Expenditures
The government budget constraints assume that to finance public spending, the govern-
ment should issue bonds and raise lump-sum taxes. As one of the main aims of this paper,
we separate government purchases into the components of expenditure of civilian (NMt)
and military (Mt) and, consequently, display a composite budget constraint as:
PtTt +R−1t Bt+1 = Bt + Pt(NMt +Mt) (5)
where : Tt ≡ λT nrt + (1− λ)T rt
where Tt denotes the real taxes (lump sum) paid by (Ricardian and non-Ricardian) con-
sumers to the government, and the variable Bt+1 the quantity of one-period bonds pur-
chased by households at time t. Pt denotes the price level. The last expression encom-
passes the sum of civilian and military components according to the additive principle.
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Equation (6) shows that linearization of the government budget constraint remains
around the steady state, with zero debt and a balanced primary budget:
bt+1 =
1
β
(bt + nmt +mt − tt) (6)
with : nmt ≡ NMt −NM
Y
and : mt ≡ Mt −M
Y
and : tt ≡ Tt − T
Y
and : bt ≡ (Bt/Pt−1)− (B/P )
Y
where nmt, mt and tt are expressed as deviations from their respective steady states
and normalized by steady state output, whereas budget deficit is given by the real deficit
at time t, divided by the last period’s prices minus the steady state nominal deficit and
normalized by steady state of output.
Fiscal policy rules have been studied extensively, for instance, by Bohn (1998) and
Galí and Perotti (2003). Here, we assume an extension that allows us to consider the two
different fiscal policy components:
tt = φbbt + φnmnmt + φmmt (7)
where φnm and φm are parameters indicating the response of taxes to civilian and
military expenditures, respectively. φb is the parameter capturing the response of taxes
to budget deficit in the case of increases in civilian and military expenditures.
If we insert the fiscal policy rule (7) into the linearized budget constraint (6), we obtain:
bt+1 =
1
β
(1− φb) bt + 1
β
(1− φnm)nmt + 1
β
(1− φm)mt (8)
A necessary and sufficient condition for non-explosive deficit dynamics is given by:
1
β
(1− φb) bt < 1 ⇒ φb > 1− β (9)
This assumption is crucial in order to choose the value of φb in the model calibration.
Civilian and military expenditures (in deviations from their respective steady states,
and normalized by output steady state) evolve exogenously, according to two distinct first
order autoregressive processes. Indeed, we assume that the resources destined for civilian
and military sectors are AR(1) processes in line with the dynamic responses of our VAR
based estimates. Following Smets and Wouters (2007), we also allow for both civilian and
military spending processes to respond to total factor productivity shock. Accordingly,
we have that:
12
nmt = ρnmnmt−1 + nmt + γnmat (10)
with : 0 < ρnm < 1, nmt ∼ N (0, σ2 )
and:
mt = ρmmt−1 + mt + γmat (11)
with : 0 < ρm < 1, mt ∼ N (0, σ2 )
where ρnm and ρm are persistence parameters, whereas nmt and mt are the i.i.d. shocks
of civilian and military expenditures. As we can observe from equations (10) and (11),
the total factor productivity shock is weighted by the steady-state shares of civilian (γnm)
and military (γm) spending on output, respectively.
4.3 Market Clearing
The final goods market is in equilibrium if production equals demand by total household
consumption, aggregate private investment and total government spending. The log-
linearized market equilibrium condition may be expressed as follows:
yt = γcct + γiit + nmt +mt (12)
where : γc = CY
γi = IY
where γc and γi denote the steady state ratios of consumption-output and investment-
output, respectively. Note that, even disentangling government spending in its compo-
nents of expenditure, the steady state of consumption does not depend on the fraction of
non-Ricardian consumers (as reported in Appendix).
4.4 Calibration of the Parameters
We propose a model calibration with quarterly data starting from "standard" parameters
extracted from new Keynesian literature. While here we discuss briefly the model param-
eters, Table 4 summarizes their values and sources. Thus, the discount factor, β, is set at
0.99, which implies an annual steady state real interest rate of 0.04. while depreciation
rate, δ, is set at 0.025 per quarter, which implies an annual depreciation on capital of 0.10.
In addition, α, at 0.30, which roughly implies a steady state share of US labor income
in total output of 0.70. In addition, we fix the parameter capturing the mark-up, µp, at
0.2. The fraction of non-Ricardian households, λ, is set at 0.5, a value which is in line
with the one assumed by Galí et al. (2007), within the range of estimated values in the
literature (see Mankiw, 2000).
The probability of firms keeping their prices unchanged, θ, is fixed at 0.65, i.e. slightly
lower than the one used by Bilbiie et al. (2008). The value for the elasticity of wages with
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respect to hours worked, ϕ, is set at 0.2, in line with the calibrations of Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997, 1999). Following King and Watson (1996), the elasticity of investment
with respect to q, η, is fixed at 1. We follow Clarida et al. (2000) in setting the parameter,
capturing the response of the monetary authority to inflation, φpi, at 1.5. This value
clearly satisfies the Taylor principle. Finally, in line with previous literature, we set the
persistence parameter for the total factor productivity shock, ρa, equal to 0.90.
Now, we focus on the parameters describing the fiscal sector which are estimated from
our sample. In equation (7), we set the parameters capturing the responses of taxes to
civilian (φnm) and military (φm) expenditures, respectively. These values are obtained as
the difference of the estimated effects of the VAR in civilian/military expenditures and
the budget deficit. In line with the findings in the literature, the estimates for our sample
are of φnm=0.16 and φm=0.18.
We also estimate the persistence parameters of civilian and military expenditures, ρnm
and ρm, according to the procedure proposed by Marques (2004), in which the absence of
mean reversion of a given series is measured by using the following statistic:
ρ = 1− n
t
(13)
where n stands for the number of times the series crosses the mean during a time interval
with t observations. Montecarlo simulations have shown the correctness and consistence
of this estimator to obtain measure of persistence.
Our VAR-based estimates indicate the lower persistence of civilian spending shock,
whereas the higher persistence appears in the estimated patterns of military expenditure.
By using the persistent estimator in equation (13), after detrending the time-series of the
fiscal components, we estimate n = 60 for civilian and n = 8 for military spending, such
as we have ρnm = 0.7 and ρm = 0.97, respectively15.
Finally, we calibrate the parameter φb such that it is consistent with the necessary and
sufficient condition for non-explosive deficit dynamics (9). Thus, we fix φb equal to 0.1.
[Table 4 about here.]
5 Impulse Response Analysis of the Simulated Model
In this section we are going to present the impulse response analysis for the theoretical
model described above. Our objective is to compare between the simulated IRFs with
those obtained from the SVAR. Our interest is for the transmission mechanisms implied by
the two different shocks to civilian and military expenditures. We start by describing the
impulse response functions of the baseline model. Afterward, we propose some robustness
exercises that are helpful to validate the behavior of the main macroeconomic variables
of interest.
15The persistence can also be obtained by the AR(1) coefficients that match the half-life of the estimated government
expenditure responses. We estimated them for civilian and military expenditures and the results were similar to the ones
based on the hypothesis of the absence of mean reversion.
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5.1 Implications for the Model with Heterogeneous Fiscal Policy Shocks
Figures 4 and 5 show the IRFs of the variables to positive civilian or military spending
shocks. The sizes of these shocks are normalized to 1% of the steady states of the respective
government expenditures.
We first discuss the implications of the model in the case of a positive civilian spend-
ing shock (Figure 4). Graph a) shows that the persistence of this shock is very low.
Interestingly, this result confirms our empirical finding of Section 3. In particular, the
low persistence of civilian spending shock reduces the negative wealth effect on Ricardian
agents. These perceive that the increase in the tax burden (in present value terms) is only
temporary and they do not change significantly their consumption level. In addition, one
year after the shock the budget deficit becomes negative and remains persistently below
zero for all the horizons considered (graph b). Thus, the reduction of budget deficit moves
further resources to consumption of Ricardian agents.
As we can observe from graph d), real wage increases after the shock occurring to
civilian spending. This result can be explained by the substantial rise of labor demand,
since the civilian spending shock causes an increase of aggregate demand. Due to sticky
price, not all the firms can change their prices after the shock, and firms that cannot
change their prices are forced to modify their production quantity. Thus, in order to
increase their output, firms rise their demand for labor and the new equilibrium in the
labor market implies an higher real wage.
The aggregate disposable income of non-Ricardian and Ricardian households increases
(graph c). As a consequence, we observe the so called "crowding-in" effect on total con-
sumption spending. This result is evident from graph e). The higher disposable income
of non-asset holders induces a substantial increase their consumption level, which leads
to the rise of private consumption expenditure.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Turning to the effects of a rise in military spending, Figure 5 shows the IRFs related
to this shock. We note a high level of persistence of military expenditure in line with our
estimated results of Section 3 (graph a). As a consequence, the negative wealth effect
is substantial on Ricardian households. Indeed, these agents decide to postpone their
consumption because they perceive that the increase of tax burden will last for a long
period.
As we can see from graph b), budget deficit expands after the shock. This result is
in accordance with the idea that policy-makers in periods of uncertainty, like wars or
threat episodes, perceive the conflict challenges and their unpredictability by developing
preferences to postpone the taxation to the future generations. However, the increase of
budget deficit further reduces the incentive of consumption in the Ricardian households
that end up holding all the bonds issued by government.
The increase of military spending shows a reduction of real wage (graph d). This effect
is mainly due to a positive shift of labor supply. Non-asset holders choose to increase their
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hours worked because of the increase in the tax burden. Similarly, Ricardian households
increase their labor supply for a given wage. The new equilibrium in the labor market
implies a lower real wage.
Overall, from graph c), the military spending shock reduces aggregate disposable in-
come of non-Ricardian and Ricardian households with a significant "crowding-out" effect
(graph e).
[Figure 5 about here.]
5.2 Robustness
5.2.1 Persistence shocks and financing mechanisms
The impulse response analysis just described shows that private consumption responds
differently according to the high/low persistences of the specific government spending
component. In what follows, we develop an exercise in order to carefully understand this
result (see Figure 6).
We start by describing the behavior of private consumption in response to different per-
sistence values of civilian spending shocks. As we can see from graph a), the "crowding-in"
effect clearly emerges in the benchmark case (ρnm = 0.7), while if we increase the value of
ρnm to 0.8, we note a negligible increase of private consumption expenditure. Accordingly,
when we fix ρnm equal to 0.97 we obtain the "crowding-out" effect on consumption.
Focusing on military spending, we run the opposite exercise. Accordingly, we start by
fixing ρm equal to 0.97 and, successively, we decrease it to 0.85 and 0.7. As expected,
private consumption responds negatively in the presence of the high shock persistence
whereas it increases when ρm is low.
In general, the persistences of civilian and military components determine the strength
of the negative wealth effect on Ricardian households induced by the increase of tax
burden. The low persistence of civilian spending shock implies a relatively small wealth
effect, and consumption of asset holders does not change substantially. Accordingly, in
the presence of a considerable rise in the consumption of non-asset holders, we observe
the "crowding-in" effect. At the contrary, the high persistence of military spending shock
causes a strong wealth effect. Thus, Ricardian households reduce substantially their
consumption causing the "crowding-out" effect.
[Figure 6 about here.]
A crucial aspect of our impulse response analysis is also related to the different fi-
nancing mechanisms of civilian and military spending. As we explained before, in our
benchmark calibration we consider the responses of taxes to civilian (φnm) and military
(φm) expenditures equal to 0.16 and 0.18, respectively. As concerns the response of taxes
to budget deficit (φb), we assume it equal to 0.1. In the following exercise, we change the
values of the parameters φnm and φm, keeping satisfied the parameterization for φb. Our
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objective is assessing the different reactions of total private consumption to these changes
(Figure 7).
We start by analyzing the case of a positive shock to civilian expenditure. We assume
three different values for φnm, that are 0.01, 0.16 (benchmark case) and 0.99. As we can
note from graph a), the "crowding-in" effect on private consumption remains unchanged in
all the three cases. However, the magnitude of the rise in total consumption expenditure
changes substantially. Interestingly, when the response of taxes to civilian spending is
particularly high, the increase of private consumption is modest compared to the case of
a low φnm.
In order to explain the last result, we need to think at the negative wealth effect on
Ricardian households caused by the increase of the tax burden. The high response of taxes
to a rise in civilian spending generates a substantial wealth effect on Ricardian agents,
postponing their current consumption. At the contrary, when φnm is low, the increase in
tax burden is small and Ricardian households do not change significantly their level of
consumption. As a consequence, the crowding effect is larger.
Turning to the military spending shock, graph b) shows the reaction of private con-
sumption to different values of φm (i.e., φm is equal to 0.01, 0.18 - benchmark case - and
0.99, respectively). It is evident that the "crowding-out" effect operates in all the three
cases. A low value of φm implies a sharp increase of the budget deficit in response to the
military spending shock. This siphons further resources away from potential consumption
of Ricardian households because they end up holding all the government bonds. At the
contrary, with an high value of φm the increase of budget deficit is less accentuated. The
latter, in turn, reduces the "crowding-out" effect on private consumption.
[Figure 7 about here.]
5.2.2 Non-Ricardian Households and Price Rigidities
Until now, we have shown the amplifying effects of the introduction of non-Ricardian
consumers and sticky prices: the consumption response is expected systematically higher
than that generated by the neoclassical model (i.e., when prices are fully flexible, and/or
when all consumers are Ricardian), irrespective of the sector of expenditure. As an
exercise, Figure 8 compares the dynamic responses of private consumption to positive
civilian (graph a)) and military (graph b)) spending shocks under our baseline calibration
and with different parameterizations of λ and θ. In both the civilian and military cases,
the solid black lines represent the benchmark case with λ and θ equal to 0.50 and 0.65,
respectively. Instead, the dash dotted green lines correspond to the case of λ fixed to 0 and
θ equal to 0.65. Finally, the dashed red lines represent the neoclassic model calibration,
which excludes non-Ricardian consumers and considers fully flexible prices (e.g., λ = 0;
θ = 0)16.
16Note that we have run several experiments under different calibrated values of λ and θ and the results are consistent
with the ones reported in the figure.
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Graph a) of Figure 8 indicates that our model predicts the "crowding-in" effect only in
the presence of a substantial share of non-Ricardian consumers. At the contrary, under
the standard assumption of RBC models (accounting only for Ricardian households), our
model generates a negative response of private consumption to the increase in civilian
spending. As a consequence, the latter result is in sharp contrast with the empirical
evidence we have shown in Section 3.
In the case of flexible economy, graph a) also shows that the increase of civilian spending
generates the "crowding-out" effect on private consumption. Evidently, aggregate demand
expands after a positive civilian spending shock. Without price rigidities, all the firms
can change their prices and they do not need to increase their production. In turn,
their demand for labor input remains unchanged and the real wage does not increase.
The simultaneous rise of tax burden reduces the household’s disposable income, with a
contraction of private consumption.
At the contrary, in the presence of price rigidities, not all the firms can change their
prices. In order to face the expansion of aggregate demand, those firms are forced to
increase their output demanding higher quantity of input factors. Thus, we observe a
positive shift of labor demand and a rise of real wage. If this increase is strong enough to
expand substantially of non-asset holder’s consumption, the "crowding-in" effect arises.
Graph b) of Figure 8 reproduces the same experiment for the military spending shock.
As we can see, moving from our new Keynesian benchmark toward models with neo-
classical characteristics, we find that the negative response of consumption to a positive
military spending shock is strengthened. Interestingly, the magnitude of the negative
impact is in accordance with the findings in the defense economics literature using partial
equilibrium specification17.
Evidently, this result is channeled by the exclusion of non-Ricardian consumers and
the flexible economy set up. Firstly, with an economy populated only by Ricardian
households, the "crowding-out" effect is large enough because of the strong negative wealth
effect on these agents. Secondly, without price rigidities, real wage does not change
significantly after the military spending shock. Accordingly, the rise of the tax burden
further reduces significantly private consumption expenditure.
[Figure 8 about here.]
6 Conclusions
This paper analyzed the effects of fiscal policy shocks on private consumption. The
particular feature of our analysis is that we explicitly allowed for the impact of both civilian
and military spending. We used time-series US quarterly data in order to reproduce IRFs
of these government spending components, emphasizing the differences with the current
literature addressed to evaluate the effects of aggregate government spending shocks.
17See, for example, Pieroni (2009).
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Most interestingly, when we examined IRF estimates of components of fiscal policy,
we found that civilian spending mimics patterns in the variables close to aggregate ones,
while a negative impact was found between military spending shock and consumption
response. Our estimates also suggest that the persistence of military spending is larger
than civilian spending one.
As second step of our analysis, we adopted a new Keynesian DSGE model which
accounts for these findings. Our main results are as follows. Focusing on increases in
military spending, we were able to calibrate the negative consumption response of the
VAR-estimates, identifying two specific channels. Firstly, the high persistence of this
expenditure increases the negative income effect on Ricardian household. Thus, these
agents reduce drastically their consumption implying the "crowding-out" effect. Secondly,
a positive response of the budget deficit, through which military spending is generally
financed, implies a further reduction in the consumption of Ricardian agents that prefer
to hold government bonds.
The new Keynesian model also predicts that the lower persistence of civilian expendi-
ture from its own shocks reduces the negative wealth effect associated to Ricardian agents.
When this effect is associated with a strong rise in the real wage, we observe a positive
response of aggregate consumption. Indeed, a high real wage stimulates the consumption
of non-asset holders that dominates the fall in consumption of Ricardian households.
Although we believe that this analysis is a useful contribution to more effective man-
agement of fiscal policy tools on the expenditure side, it does leave several interesting
questions open for future research. Firstly, the general validity of our findings is certainly
limited by the closed-economy one-country investigation. We believe that comparative
analysis would give a more complete answer to our original question. Secondly, issues
in estimating the parameter of non-Ricardian households has received increasing interest
in the macro-econometric literature. Obviously, a framework which includes Bayesian
estimation provides opportunities for future research.
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Appendix: Steady State Analysis of the Components of Fiscal
Policy
Here we show that the steady state ratio of consumption to total output does not depend
on the fraction of non-Ricardian consumers. Note that the market clearing condition for
final goods implies:
Yt = Ct + It +NMt +Mt ⇒ Ct = Yt − It −NMt −Mt (A1)
and in steady state:
C = Y − I −NM −M (A2)
Dividing by Y and knowing that I
K
= δ, we can write:
γc = 1− δα
α Y
K
− γnm − γm (A3)
where γc = CY , γnm =
NM
Y
and γm = MY .
When we consider the marginal product of capital:
α
Y
K
λt (j) = Rk (A4)
the first order condition of the intermediate firm’s problem in steady state:
MC = 1
µp
= λt (j) (A5)
we obtain:
Rk = αY
µpK
(A6)
Let:
Rk = 1
β
− 1 + δ (A7)
we can equate:
Rk = 1
β
− 1 + δ = αY
µpK
= Rkt (A8)
solving for:
1
β
− 1 + δ = αY
µpK
⇒ αY
K
= µp
(
1
β
− 1 + δ
)
(A9)
Lastly, we obtain:
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γc = 1− δα
α Y
K
− γnm − γm
= (1− γnm − γm)− δα
α Y
K
= (1− γnm − γm)− δα
µp
(
1
β
− 1 + δ
)
This result confirms that the steady state ratio between consumption and output is
independent from share of non-Ricardian consumers.
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Notes: The relative shares of civilian and military expenditures on GDP are obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(National Economic Accounts).
Figure 1: Civilian and Military Expenditures as shares of GDP
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Notes: Estimated impulse responses to a civilian spending shock in SVAR. Sample Period 1960:1-2010:4. Horizontal axis:
quarters after shock. Confidence intervals: (+/-)1 standard deviations of empirical distributions, based on 10,000 Monte
Carlo replications.
Figure 2: Response of VAR Model to a Civilian Spending Shock
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Notes: Estimated impulse responses to a military spending shock in SVAR. Sample Period 1960:1-2010:4. Horizontal axis:
quarters after shock. Confidence intervals: (+/-)1 standard deviations of empirical distributions, based on 10,000 Monte
Carlo replications.
Figure 3: Response of VAR Model to a Military Spending Shock
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Notes: The shock is normalized to 1% of civilian expenditure in steady state.
Figure 4: Dynamic Effects of Civilian Spending Shock
.
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Notes: The shock is normalized to 1% of military expenditure in steady state.
Figure 5: Dynamic Effects of Military Spending Shock
.
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Notes: for civilian spending the solid black line corresponds to ρnm = 0.70, the dash red line to
ρnm = 0.85 and the dash dotted green line to ρnm = 0.97; for military spending the solid black line
corresponds to ρm = 0.97, the dash red line to ρm = 0.85 and the dash dotted green line to ρm = 0.70.
Figure 6: Consumption Sensitivity: Different Shock Persistences of Civilian and Military Expenditures
.
31
Notes: for civilian spending the solid black line corresponds to φnm = 0.16, the dash red line to
φnm = 0.01 and the dash dotted green line to φnm = 0.99; for military spending the solid black line
corresponds to φm = 0.18, the dash red line to φm = 0.01 and the dash dotted green line to φm = 0.99.
Figure 7: Consumption Sensitivity: Different Financing Mechanisms of Civilian and Military Expendi-
tures
.
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Notes: in both civilian and military shocks the solid black lines correspond to benchmark values of λ and
θ, the dash dotted green lines to λ = 0 and θ = 0.65 and the dotted red lines to λ = 0 and θ = 0.
Figure 8: Consumption Sensitivity for Different Values of λ and θ
.
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Table A.1: Government spending and financing mechanisms in the US for military conflicts and episodes
Time Military outlay Civilian outlay Budget Deficit Tax-revenue
(% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% of GDP)
Vietnam conflict Q1-1963 13.61 17.53 -0.85 28.83
Q1-1965 11.21 17.67 -0.03 28.12
Q1-1967 13.18 18.09 -2.71 28.51
Q1-1969 12.15 17.81 0.43 31.57
Q1-1971 9.73 17.99 -2.47 29.54
Q1-1973 7.56 17.15 -0.19 31.28
Q1-1975 7.21 18.76 -4.26 30.64
Carter-Reagan Q1-1980 6.40 16.71 -2.12 31.36
Military Build-up Q1-1982 7.16 16.38 -3.89 32.33
Q1-1984 7.46 15.15 -4.56 31.46
Q1-1986 7.72 15.82 -5.02 32.00
Q1-1988 7.89 15.41 -4.04 32.76
Desert Storm Q1-1989 7.35 15.39 -2.86 33.19
Operation Q1-1991 7.45 16.27 -4.06 33.03
Q1-1993 6.27 16.00 -5.83 32.46
11 September 2001 Q1-1999 4.21 14.92 0.63 34.84
and 2nd Iraq War Q1-2000 4.01 14.81 1.79 35.73
Q1-2001 4.09 14.83 0.93 35.49
Q1-2002 4.27 15.34 -3.50 32.17
Q1-2003 4.44 15.32 -4.68 31.76
Q1-2004 4.73 14.69 -4.90 31.28
Notes: Percentages of civilian and military expenditures over GDP obtained from Bureau of Economic Analysis (various
years). Budget deficit and tax revenues as percentages of GDP from OECD Economic Outlook, No. 88.
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Table A.2: Estimated fiscal policy effects (civilian and military spending)
Estimated Fiscal Policy Multipliers
Quarters 1 4 8 12
Civilian spending 0.06 0.36 0.82 1.01
[0.04/0.09] [0.33/0.39] [0.78/0.87] [0.96/1.06]
Military spending -0.09 -0.11 -0.10 -0.08
[-0.08/-0.11] [-0.08/-0.13] [-0.07/-0.13] [-0.05/-0.12]
Notes: Results from cumulated IRFs. 95% confidence intervals (CI) are listed in brackets.
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Table A.3: Linearized model equations
Equations Log-linearized equation
Tobin’s q equation qt = βEt {qt+1}+[1− β (1− δ)]Et
{
rkt+1
}
− (rt − Et {pit+1})
Investment equation it − kt = ηqt
Capital accumulation kt+1 = δit + (1− δ) kt
Euler equation for Ricardians crt = Et {crt+1} − (rt − Et {pit+1})
Euler equation for non-Ricardians cnrt =
(
WNnr
Cnr
)
(wt + nnrt )−
(
Y
Cr
)
tnrt
Aggregate consumption equation ct = λcnrt + (1− λ) crt
Aggregate hours worked equation nt = λnnrt + (1− λ)nrt
Wage equation wt = ct + ϕnt
Intertemporal eq. condition for agg. cons. ct = Et {ct+1} − σ (rt − Et {pit+1})−
ΘnEt {∆nt+1}+ ΘtaxEt {∆tnrt+1}
New Keynesian Phillips curve pit = β {pit+1} − λpµˆpt
Price mark-up equation µpt = (yt − nt)− wt = (yt − kt)− rkt
Production function of final good firms yt = at + (1− α)nt + αkt
Monetary policy function rt = r + φpipit
Total Factor Productivity Shock at = ρaat−1 + at
Definitions
tnrt =
Tnrt −Tnr
Y
rt ≡ Rt − 1
Parameters
σ = γcΦµp (1− λ)
Θn = λΦ (1− α) (1 + ϕ)
Θtax = λΦµp
Φ = (γcµp − λ (1− α))−1
γc ≡ CY
λp = (1− βθ) (1− θ) 1θ
Notes: Lower-case letters denote log-deviations with respect to the corresponding steady state values. qt is the current value of
capital stock, rkt+1, the expected rental rate, rt, the nominal interest rate, pit+1, the expected inflation, it, the investment, kt,
the capital service, crt , the consumption of Ricardian households, c
nr
t , the consumption of non-Ricardian households, n
r
t , the
hours worked of Ricardian households, nnrt , the hours worked of non-Ricardian households, wt, the real wage rate, t
nr
t , the
lump sum taxes of non-Ricardian consumers, ct, the aggregate consumption, nt, the aggregate hours worked, µpt , the price
mark-up, yt, the final output, at, the total factor productivity.
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Table A.4: Calibrated Parameters of the Model
Parameter Symbol Value Target/Source
Discount Factor β 0.99 Steady state real interest rate: 0.04
Elasticity of Investment wrt q η 1 King and Watson (1996)
Depreciation Rate δ 0.025 Annual depreciation on capital: 0.10
Fraction of non-Ricardians λ 0.5 Galì et al. (2007)
Capital Share α 1/3 Labor share: 70%
Elasticity of Wages wrt Hours Worked ϕ 0.2 Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1999)
Mark-up Parameter µp 0.2 Galì et al. (2007)
Probability of Price Fixed θ 0.65 Average price duration: 4 quarters
Policy Rate Response to Inflation φpi 1.5 Clarida et al. (2000)
Response of Taxes to Civilian Spending φnm 0.16 Estimates from our data sample
Response of Taxes to Military Spending φm 0.18 Estimates from our data sample
Response of Taxes to Budget Deficit φb 0.1 Calibrated according cond. in Eq. (8)
Persistence of Civilian Spending ρnm 0.7 Estimates from our sample
Persistence of Military Spending ρm 0.97 Estimates from our sample
Persistence of TFP ρa 0.99 King and Rebelo (1999)
Notes: Calibration of the parameters according quarterly data.
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